Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation

  • Thomas Bustamante
  • Christian Dahlman

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 112)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvi
  2. Argument Types or Fallacies?

  3. Argument Types and Legal Interpretation

  4. Back Matter
    Pages 219-222

About this book

Introduction

This book provides theoretical tools for evaluating the soundness of arguments in the context of legal argumentation. It deals with a number of general argument types and their particular use in legal argumentation. It provides detailed analyses of argument from authority, argument ad hominem, argument from ignorance, slippery slope argument and other general argument types. Each of these argument types can be used to construct arguments that are sound as well as arguments that are unsound. To evaluate an argument correctly one must be able to distinguish the sound instances of a certain argument type from its unsound instances. This book promotes the development of theoretical tools for this task.

Keywords

Absence of Evidence Ad Hominem Fallacies Anti-Theoretical Fallacy Argument Types Authority and the Conversion of Fallacious Arguments Dworkin’s Answer to Posner’s Analysis of Bush v. Gore Epistemic Credibility Fallacies in Legal Argumentation Frames of Interpretation Frames of Interpretation Generality and the Conversion of Fallacious Arguments Imprecise Expressions in Argumentation Legal Argumentation Slippery Slope Arguments Statutory Expression and Proportionality

Editors and affiliations

  • Thomas Bustamante
    • 1
  • Christian Dahlman
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculdade de DireitoUniversidade Federal de Minas GeraisBelo HorizonteBrazil
  2. 2.Faculty of LawLund UniversityLundSweden

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16148-8
  • Copyright Information Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-16147-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-16148-8
  • Series Print ISSN 1572-4395
  • Series Online ISSN 2215-0315
  • About this book