© 2019


Can Self-Consciousness be Understood as a Feeling?


Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 107)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvii
  2. Part I

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 49-57
    3. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 59-60
  3. Part II

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 61-61
    2. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 101-117
    3. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 119-119
  4. Part III

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 121-121
    2. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 123-148
    3. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 161-170
    4. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 171-195
    5. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 197-197
  5. Part IV

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 199-199
    2. Gerhard Kreuch
      Pages 201-216

About this book


This monograph offers new insights into the connection between self-consciousness and emotion. It focuses on what fundamental “feelings of being” tell us about ourselves. The results enrich the philosophy of human affectivity and help shed new light on some pressing, current problems.

The author seeks to understand self-consciousness as an affective phenomenon, namely as self-feeling. He identifies it as a pre-reflective, pre-propositional, bodily feeling that shapes our space of possibilities. It is the affective disclosure of individual existence. His account overcomes the difficulties of infinite regress and vicious circularity that reflective (or higher-order) accounts of self-consciousness struggle with. At the same time, it helps build a bridge between the basic level of self-consciousness and the higher level of more substantial thoughts about oneself. The title explores fundamental affectivity, Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings, features of self-feeling, and appropriateness and inappropriateness in self-interpretation. It also considers the contributions of the Heidelberg School of self-consciousness to current debates.

The title provides students and researchers with a unique look into such vital philosophical questions as: What is self-consciousness? How do we know ourselves? It will also appeal to a wider audience interested in self-consciousness and/or human affectivity since it does not presuppose knowledge of the jargon.


Features of self-feeling Feelings of Being Heidelberg School Individual existence Knowing Oneself Phenomenology and subjectivity Philosophy of human affectivity Philosophy of self-consciousness Pre-propositional Self-Knowledge Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness Self-feeling Self-feeling and unity Self-interpretation Theory of existential feelings

Authors and affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ViennaViennaAustria

About the authors

Gerhard Kreuch completed two graduate degrees in philosophy and socio-economics. During his PhD in philosophy he was Visiting Researcher at Stanford University. He was awarded the uni:docs fellowship for the best dissertation projects, the Marietta Blau Grant for studies abroad, and the prize for the best philosophical dissertation at the University of Vienna in 2017. His research focuses on questions of self-knowledge, self-consciousness, and philosophy of emotions.​

Bibliographic information