The Aftermath of Defeats in War

Between Revenge and Recovery

  • Ibrahim M. Zabad

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xi
  2. Ibrahim M. Zabad
    Pages 1-45
  3. Ibrahim M. Zabad
    Pages 153-225
  4. Ibrahim M. Zabad
    Pages 297-311
  5. Back Matter
    Pages 313-318

About this book


This book sets out to explain the variation in nations’ reactions to their defeats in war. Typically, we observe two broad reactions to defeat: an inward-oriented response that accepts defeat as a reality and utilizes it as an opportunity for a new beginning, and an outward-oriented one that rejects defeat and invests national energies in restoring what was lost—most likely by force. This volume argues that although defeats in wars are humiliating experiences, those sentiments do not necessarily trigger aggressive nationalism, empower radical parties, and create revisionist foreign policy. Post-defeat, radicalization will be actualized only if it is filtered through three variables: national self-images (inflated or realistic), political parties (strong or weak), and international opportunities and constraints. The author tests this theory on four detailed case studies, Egypt (1967), Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Hungary and Bulgaria (WWI), and Islamic fundamentalism. 

Ibrahim M. Zabad is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Studies program at St. Bonaventure University, USA. 


defeat in war defeat aftermath nationalism and national self-image national humiliation radicalization domestic radical politics Egypt Turkey and the Ottoman Empire Hungary Bulgaria

Authors and affiliations

  • Ibrahim M. Zabad
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceSt. Bonaventure UniversitySt. Bonaventure, NYUSA

Bibliographic information