Multicriteria Decision Making and Differential Games

  • George Leitmann

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xv
  2. W. E. Schmitendorf, G. Moriarty
    Pages 163-172
  3. M. Simaan, J. B. Cruz Jr.
    Pages 173-195
  4. I. G. Sarma, U. R. Prasad
    Pages 211-232
  5. P. R. Kleindorfer, M. R. Sertel
    Pages 277-295
  6. S. Clemhout, H. Y. Wan Jr.
    Pages 297-302
  7. Y. C. Ho, F. K. Sun
    Pages 305-319
  8. W. H. Hartman
    Pages 359-367
  9. A. Sprzeuzkouski
    Pages 399-414
  10. A. W. Merz
    Pages 421-442
  11. P. Hagedorn, J . V. Breakwell
    Pages 443-457
  12. Back Matter
    Pages 459-461

About this book


This volume is a collection of contributions to the subject of multicriteria decision making and differential games, all of which are based wholly or in part on papers that have appeared in the Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. The authors take this opportunity to revise, update, or enlarge upon their earlier publications. The theory of multicriteria decision making and differential games is concerned with situations in which a single decision maker is faced with a multiplicity of usually incompatible criteria, performance indices or payoffs, or in which a number of decision makers, or players, must take into account criteria each of which depends on the decisions of all the decision makers. The first six chapters are devoted to situations involving a single decision maker, or a number of decision makers in complete collaboration and thus being in effect a single decision maker. Chapters I -IV treat various topics in the theory of domination structures and nondominated decisions. Chapter V presents a discussion of efficient, or Pareto-optimal, decisions. The approach to multicriteria decision making via preference relations is explored in Chapter VI. When there is more than one decision maker, cooperation, as well as noncooperation, is possible. Chapters VII and VIII deal with the topic of coalitions in a dynamic setting, while Chapters IX and X address the situation of two unequal decision makers, a leader and a follower.


cooperation optimization

Editors and affiliations

  • George Leitmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mechanical EngineeringUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA

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