Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare

Proceedings of a Conference held in Barcelona, Spain, by the International Economic Association

  • John E. Roemer

Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xviii
  2. Welfare and Property Relations

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Joaquim Silvestre
      Pages 43-68
    3. Karl Ove Moene, Michael Wallerstein
      Pages 69-93
  3. Finance And Control

  4. Distribution and the Type of Firm

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 217-217
    2. Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
      Pages 243-267
  5. Transition to the Market

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 269-269
    2. Philippe Aghion, Olivier Jean Blanchard, Wendy Carlin
      Pages 271-325
    3. Martin L. Weitzman, Chenggang Xu
      Pages 326-355
  6. Democracy and Distribution

  7. Back Matter
    Pages 395-408

About this book


The dramatic implosions of the centrally administered, non-democratic political systems in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s have generated a body of research concerning the transition from public ownership, and the role of the market and other institutions in engendering good incentives for economic actors. The essays collected in this volume study property relations, their associated incentives and the consequent effects on welfare: the ubiquitous theme is that efficiency cannot be divorced from the distribution of productive assets.


capitalism corporate governance democracy Distribution economics employment gender governance Institution Investment restructuring trade trust

Editors and affiliations

  • John E. Roemer
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaDavisUSA

Bibliographic information