Classics in the Theory of Public Finance

  • Editors
  • Richard A. Musgrave
  • Alan T. Peacock

Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xxiii
  2. Adolph Wagner
    Pages 1-15
  3. Lorenz Von Stein
    Pages 28-36
  4. Arnold Jacob Cohen Stuart
    Pages 48-71
  5. Knut Wicksell
    Pages 72-118
  6. Francis Ysidro Edgeworth
    Pages 119-136
  7. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu
    Pages 152-164
  8. Enrico Barone
    Pages 165-167
  9. Erik Lindahl
    Pages 168-176
  10. Emil Sax
    Pages 177-189
  11. Friedrich von Wieser
    Pages 190-201
  12. Hans Ritschl
    Pages 233-241
  13. Back Matter
    Pages 243-244

About this book


This book was prepared mainly for specialists on the assumption that it would provide the background to an important neglected field of discussion in public finance. Since it was first published in 1958, the theory of public goods and its implications for public policy have become incorporated in the main body of the economic analysis of public finance in the literature. A glance at the footnotes of some of the standard textbooks on public finance indicates that this assembly of articles has not been in vain. Probably the most influential part of this collection has been the papers concerned with the theory of public expenditure, which contains two closely related elements. The first is as a part of welfare economics: under what conditions can Pareto optimality be achieved in an economic system in which some goods supplied are indivisible? The other strand of thought is concerned with the positive theory of the public sector: how can economic analysis be used in order to explain how the size and composition of the budget is actually determined?


Distribution economics economy public finance taxation

Bibliographic information