Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency

Essays in Honor of Birgit Grodal

  • Christian Schultz
  • Karl Vind

Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 25)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XII
  2. Andreu Mas-Colell
    Pages 1-7
  3. Robert M. Anderson, Roberto C. Raimondo
    Pages 27-48
  4. Morten Bennedsen, Christian Schultz
    Pages 49-68
  5. Gaetano Bloise, Jacques H. Drèze, Herakles M. Polemarchakis
    Pages 69-93
  6. Antoni Bosch-Domènech, Joaquim Silvestre
    Pages 95-116
  7. Egbert Dierker, Hildegard Dierker, Birgit Grodal
    Pages 117-129
  8. Bryan Ellickson, William Zame
    Pages 131-147
  9. Bryan Ellickson, Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer, William R. Zame
    Pages 149-185
  10. Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller
    Pages 187-209
  11. Birgit Grodal, Karl Vind
    Pages 211-223
  12. P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Herakles Polemarchakis
    Pages 225-244
  13. Werner Hildenbrand, Alois Kneip
    Pages 245-259
  14. Mogens Jensen, Birgitte Sloth, Hans Jøgen Whitta-Jacobsen
    Pages 273-293
  15. Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber
    Pages 295-315
  16. Lars Tyge Nielsen
    Pages 317-329
  17. John E. Roemer
    Pages 331-349
  18. Back Matter
    Pages 381-383

About this book


Competition and efficiency is at the core of economic theory. This volume collects papers of leading scholars, which extend the conventional general equilibrium model in important ways: Efficiency and price regulation are studied when markets are incomplete and existence of equilibria in such settings is proven under very general preference assumptions. The model is extended to include geographical location choice, a commodity space incorporating manufacturing imprecision and preferences for club-membership, schools and firms. Inefficiencies arising from household externalities or group membership are evaluated. Core equivalence is shown for bargaining economies. The theory of risk aversion is extended and the relation between risk taking and wealth is experimentally investigated. Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.


Economic efficiency Economic equilibrium Incomplete Markets Market structure Markov Chain

Editors and affiliations

  • Christian Schultz
    • 1
  • Karl Vind
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagen KDenmark

Bibliographic information