Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd Edition

  • Allan M. Feldman
  • Roberto Serrano

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xii
  2. Pages 1-9
  3. Pages 33-49
  4. Pages 119-142
  5. Pages 143-159
  6. Pages 161-193
  7. Pages 195-216
  8. Pages 229-251
  9. Pages 253-274
  10. Pages 321-343
  11. Pages 345-361
  12. Pages 363-369
  13. Back Matter
    Pages 371-403

About this book


Welfare economics, and social choice theory, are disciplines that blend economics, ethics, political science, and mathematics.

Topics in Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd Edition, include models of economic exchange and production, uncertainty, optimality, public goods, social improvement criteria, life and death choices, majority voting, Arrow’s theorem, and theories of implementation and mechanism design.

Our goal is to make value judgments about economic and political mechanisms:  For instance, does the competitive market produce distributions of products and services that are good or bad for society?   Does majority voting produce good or bad outcomes?  How can we design tax mechanisms that result in efficient amounts of public goods being produced?

We have attempted, in this book, to minimize mathematical obstacles, and to make this field accessible to undergraduate and graduate students and the interested non-expert.


Welfare Welfare economics economics mechanism design production social choice strategy utility

Authors and affiliations

  • Allan M. Feldman
    • 1
  • Roberto Serrano
    • 1
  1. 1.Brown UniversityUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
  • Publisher Name Springer, Boston, MA
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-0-387-29367-7
  • Online ISBN 978-0-387-29368-4
  • Buy this book on publisher's site