The standard Engineer-Lawyer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) points to the failure of reasoners to integrate mentioned base-rate information in arriving at likelihood estimates. Research in this area nevertheless has presupposed that participants respect complementarity (i.e., participants ensure that competing estimates add up to 100%). A survey of the literature leads us to doubt this presupposition. We propose that the participants’ non-normative performance on the standard Engineer- Lawyer problem reflects a reluctance to view the task probabilistically and that normative responses become more prominent as probabilistic aspects of the task do. In the present experiments, we manipulated two kinds of probabilistic cues and determined the extent to which (1) base rates were integrated and (2) the complementarity constraint was respected. In Experiment 1, six versions of an Engineer-Lawyer-type problem (that varied three levels of cue to complementarity and two base rates) were presented. The results showed that base-rate integration increased as cues to complementarity did. Experiment 2 confirmed that Gigerenzer, Hell, and Blank’s (1988) random-draw paradigm facilitates base-rate integration; a second measure revealed that it also prompts respect for complementarity. In Experiment 3, we replicated two of our main findings in one procedure while controlling for the potential influence of extraneous task features. We discuss approaches that describe how probabilistic cues might prompt normative responding.
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This work was partially funded by a grant from DRET (La Direction de la Recherche et de la Technologie, 94/074) in France.
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Baratgin, J., Noveck, I.A. Not only base rates are neglected in the Engineer-Lawyer problem: An investigation of reasoners’ underutilization of complementarity. Memory & Cognition 28, 79–91 (2000). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03211578