Abstract
What decisions should we make? Moral values, rules, and virtues provide standards for morally acceptable decisions, without prescribing how we should reach them. However, moral theories do assume that we are, at least in principle, capable of making the right decisions. Consequently, an empirical investigation of the methods and resources we use for making moral decisions becomes relevant. We consider theoretical parallels of economic decision theory and moral utilitarianism and suggest that moral decision making may tap into mechanisms and processes that have originally evolved for nonmoral decision making. For example, the computation of reward value occurs through the combination of probability and magnitude; similar computation might also be used for determining utilitarian moral value. Both nonmoral and moral decisions may resort to intuitions and heuristics. Learning mechanisms implicated in the assignment of reward value to stimuli, actions, and outcomes may also enable us to determine moral value and assign it to stimuli, actions, and outcomes. In conclusion, we suggest that moral capabilities can employ and benefit from a variety of nonmoral decision-making and learning mechanisms.
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This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust, the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Roche Research Foundation, and Senter Novem. The collaboration between the authors was made possible by a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation, and the article has been written as part of the European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind Sciences, and the Humanities initiative of the Volkswagen Foundation.
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Tobler, P.N., Kalis, A. & Kalenscher, T. The role of moral utility in decision making: An interdisciplinary framework. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 8, 390–401 (2008). https://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.8.4.390
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.8.4.390