Abstract
This study attempted to clarify the conditions in which threats are conducive to cooperation. Pairs of Ss in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game either had the opportunity to send threat and penalty messages, or they did not. In addition, pairs were either of high or low mutual positive attraction, manipulated by perceived attitude similarity. In terms of the number of cooperative responses in the game, the high mutual attraction conditions showed significantly more cooperative behavior than those groups of low mutual attraction. A significant interaction effect was demonstrated: Over blocks of trials the efficacy of threats and penalties in inducing cooperation was contingent upon whether the Ss were of high or low mutual attraction. As the game progressed the no-threat condition produced more cooperation than the threat/penalty condition providing high mutual attraction was present; with low mutual attraction, the threat/penalty condition was increasingly superior to the no-threat condition. In general, the beneficial effect of threats in low attraction dyads was not observable in high attraction pairs. These results were interpreted as reflecting the incongruity of threats and penalties in a “friendly” interaction.
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This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, GS-1680, to the junior author.
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Tornatzky, L., Geiwitz, P.J. The effects of threat and attraction on interpersonal bargaining. Psychon Sci 13, 125–126 (1968). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03342442
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03342442