Abstract
Ss played a modified prisoner’s dilemma game under one of four incentive conditions with either a cooperative or a competitive partner. In one population sample, when Ss were playing for points, a money (rather than points) reward for partners elicited significantly more cooperation. In a second population sample, Ss reciprocated their partners’ strategy only when the Ss were playing for money rather than points. The possible effect of socioeconomic differences is discussed.
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Solomon, L.Z., Kaufmann, H. The effects of reward structure and partner’s cooperation upon strategy. Psychon Sci 26, 87–88 (1972). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03335441
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03335441