Abstract
An experiment was conducted to demonstrate that previous research using the PDG has neglected to separate the effects of strategy from the types of outcomes associated with two-person two-choice games, i.e.; whether it be a two-outcome, three-outcome, or standard four-outcome game. The types of outcomes and the contingent strategies of a “dummy” were manipulated. Two strategies were used in the standard PDG four-outcome game, four strategies were varied in the three-outcome game, and one strategy was used in a two-outcome game. Seventy Ss, 10 under each strategy level, were run. A significant difference between the two-outcome game and the three- and four-outcome games on cooperation proportion over 100 iterations of the game was found. No differences were found between strategies within types. It was concluded that experimentation utilizing “dummy” strategy manipulations must not be of such a nature as to confound types of outcomes with the strategy levels. Also, a S’s game behavior does not seem to be sensitive to strategy differences of the “other” player when cooperations over all trials is the dependent variable.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
BIXENSTINE, V. E., POTASH, H. M., & WILSON, K. V. Effects of level of cooperative choice by the other player on choices in a prisoner’s dilemma game: Part 1. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1963, 66, 308–313.
BIXENSTINE, V. E., & WILSON, K. V. Effects of level of cooperative choices in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Part II. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1963, 67, 139–147.
McCLINTOCK, C. G., HARRISON, A., STRAND, S., & GALLO, P. Internationalism, isolationism, strategy of the other player, and two-person game behavior. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1963, 67, 631–635.
RAPOPORT, A., & CHAMMAH, A. M. Prisoner’s dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.
SOLOMON, L. The influence of some types of power relationships and game strategies upon the development of interpersonal trust. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1960, 61, 223–230.
STEELE, M. W., & TEDESCHI, J. T. Matrix indices and mixed-motive games. J. conflict Resolut., 1967, 11, 198–205.
SWINGLE, P. G., & COADY, H. Effects of the partner’s abrupt strategy change upon subject’s responding in the prisoner’s dilemma. J. Pers. soc. Psychol., 1967, 5(3), 357–364.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
1. Based on a paper read as a part of a symposium on “The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game” at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association in Atlanta, April, 1967.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tedeschi, J.T., Aranoff, D. & Gahagan, J.P. Discrimination of outcomes in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Psychon Sci 11, 301–302 (1968). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03328202
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03328202