Abstract
The present study examines the applicability of a rational model of categorical inference (e.g., Revlis, 1975b) to account for the apparently irrational decisions students reach on categorical syllogisms. In Experiment 1, students judged the logical validity of emotionally neutral conclusions to controversial premises. Of the reasoners’ decisions, 80% can be accounted for by the application of rational rules to their idiosyncratic encoding of the syllogistic premises. In Experiment 2, students were asked to solve syllogisms whose conclusions varied in truth value. When asked to reason about controversial, if not emotional, material, students do not suspend rational choice, but rather, their decisions are judicious ones, flowing logically from their idiosyncratic understanding of the materials reasoned about. When errors do occur, they result from an interrupt to rational processes and reflect conflict between competing goals rather than a switch to irrational decision processes.
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This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation (BNS78-24763) to R. Revlin.
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Revlin, R., Leirer, V., Yopp, H. et al. The belief-bias effect in formal reasoning: The influence of knowledge on logic. Memory & Cognition 8, 584–592 (1980). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03213778
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03213778