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Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers

, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 417–422 | Cite as

FISH 3: A microworld for studying social dilemmas and resource management

  • Jonas Gifford
  • Robert GiffordEmail author
Article

Abstract

A Java-based microworld environment for studying resource management is described. FISH 3 may be used in research or the classroom to investigate commons dilemmas and resource dilemmas. The program uses ocean fishing as its metaphor; participants (“fishers”) experience the metaphor through both graphics (“fish” may be seen in an ocean) and text (e.g., resource replenishment is translated as “spawning”). In either stand-alone or networked modes, either with all human fishers or a mixture of human and computer fishers, 15 parameters such as the number of resource units (fish), participants (fishers), and trials (seasons), payoff values, the rate and period of resource regeneration (spawning), harvesting greed by computer fishers, awareness of other harvesters’ actions, uncertainty in the amount of the resource, operating costs, and whether the resource is visible to harvesters may be varied.

Keywords

Fishing Behavior Research Method Hine Social Dilemma Common Dilemma 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Supplementary material

Gifford-BRM-2000.zip (15 kb)
Supplementary material, approximately 340 KB.

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Copyright information

© Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of VictoriaVictoriaCanada

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