Abstract
A model is advanced for the process of explanation, according to which (a) an event to be explained is understood to be a value on a particular dimension of variation; (b) a circumstance believed to explain the event is understood to be a value on another dimension of variation; (c) the two dimensions are understood to be related such that the dimension whose value is to be explained is more likely to take that value when the dimension of circumstance takes its obtaining value than when the dimension of circumstance takes an alternative value. Evidence for the model is reported from a study in which Ss made two judgments about a human action—wchich of two statements of circumstance specifying alternative values for a certain dimension was the better explanation for the action, and which of the same two statements described the case in which the action, or for certain items the opposite action, was more likely to occur. For each of five different actions, the judgments were significantly related as required by the model.
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The author wishes to thank David Mladenoff for help in the execution of the study reported here and Sharon Gurwitz for careful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.
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Bear, G. Cognition of the relation between an event and a circumstance understood to explain the event. Memory & Cognition 2, 491–496 (1974). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196910
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196910