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Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 343–352 | Cite as

Evidence accumulation in decision making: Unifying the “take the best” and the “rational” models

  • Michael D. LeeEmail author
  • Tarrant D. R. Cummins
Brief Reports

Abstract

An evidence accumulation model of forced-choice decision making is proposed to unify the fast and frugaltake the best (TTB) model and the alternativerational (RAT) model with which it is usually contrasted. The basic idea is to treat the TTB model as a sequential-sampling process that terminates as soon as any evidence in favor of a decision is found and the rational approach as a sequential-sampling process that terminates only when all available information has been assessed. The unified TTB and RAT models were tested in an experiment in which participants learned to make correct judgments for a set of real-world stimuli on the basis of feedback, and were then asked to make additional judgments without feedback for cases in which the TTB and the rational models made different predictions. The results show that, in both experiments, there was strong intraparticipant consistency in the use of either the TTB or the rational model but large interparticipant differences in which model was used. The unified model is shown to be able to capture the differences in decision making across participants in an interpretable way and is preferred by the minimum description length model selection criterion.

Keywords

Unify Model Stimulus Pair Evidence Accumulation Stimulus Domain Random Walk Move 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of AdelaideAdelaideAustralia

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