Abstract
Pigeons played a repeated prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that reflected their choices: If a pigeon cooperated on trial n, the computer cooperated on trial n + 1; if the pigeon defected on trial n, the computer defected on trial n + 1. Cooperation thus maximized reinforcement in the long term, but defection was worth more on the current trial. Under these circumstances, pigeons normally defect. However, when a signal correlated with the pigeon's previous choice immediately followed each current trial choice, some pigeons learned to cooperate. Furthermore, cooperation was higher when trials were close together in time than when they were separated by long intertrial intervals.
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The research was supported by grants to the second author from the National Institute of Mental Health and the National Institute for Drug Abuse.
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Baker, F., Rachlin, H. Self-control by pigeons in the prisoner's dilemma. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9, 482–488 (2002). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196303
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196303