Abstract
Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl’s (1983; Libet, 1985) influential work using a clock-watching task suggests that voluntary actions are initiated in motor cortex prior to the point where the participant claims to have initiated that action. Joordens, van Duijn, and Spalek (2002) showed that a bias exists in this task with respect to the participants’ reports of initiation times. Joordens et al. assumed that this bias was primarily due to motion cues that are very much like those used to elicit phenomena such as representational momentum. In the present Experiment 1, it is demonstrated that this bias disappears when a mouse-click response is used in place of a temporal-order judgment. This finding, however, is actually more confusing than clarifying given that the procedural parallels with representational momentum are still present and should be supporting a bias. In the three subsequent experiments the view that a bias is indeed present, but that it is opposed by an opposite-acting compensation process, is proposed and tested. Implications for both representational momentum and for the general use of clock-watching tasks (e.g., Libet et al., 1983) are highlighted.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Cheesman, J., &Merikle, P. M. (1986). Distinguishing conscious from unconscious processes.Canadian Journal of Psychology,40, 343–367.
Craik, F. I. M. (1982). Selective changes in encoding as a function of reduced processing capacity. In F. Klix, J. Hoffman, & E. van der Meer (Eds.),Cognitive research in psychology (pp. 152–161). Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
Finke, R. A., &Freyd, J. J. (1985). Transformations of visual memory induced by implied motions of pattern elements.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition,11, 780–794.
Finke, R. A., Freyd, J. J., &Shyi, G. C. W. (1986). Implied velocity and acceleration induce transformations of visual memory.Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,115, 175–188.
Freyd, J. J. (1987). Dynamic mental representations.Psychological Review,94, 427–438.
Freyd, J. J., &Finke, R. A. (1984). Representational momentum.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition,10, 126–132.
Freyd, J. J., &Johnson, J. Q. (1987). Probing the time course of representational momentum.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition,13, 259–268.
Fröhlich, F. W. (1923). Über die Messung der Empfindungszeit [Measuring the time of sensation].Zeitschrift für Sinnesphysiologie,54, 58–78.
Gray, R., &Thornton, I. M. (2001). Exploring the link between time to collision and representational momentum.Perception,30, 1007–1022.
Groeger, J. A. (1984). Evidence of unconscious semantic processing from a forced error situation.British Journal of Psychology,75, 305–314.
Halpern, A. R., &Kelly, M. H. (1993). Memory biases in left versus right implied motion.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition,19, 471–484.
Hayes, A. E., &Freyd J. J. (2002). Representational momentum when attention is divided.Visual Cognition,9, 8–27.
Hazelhoff, F. F., &Wiersma, H. (1924). Die Wahrnehmungszeit [The sensation of time].Zeitschrift für Psychologie,96, 171–188.
Hubbard, T. L. (1990). Cognitive representations of linear motion: Possible direction and gravity effects in judged displacement.Memory & Cognition,18, 299–309.
Hubbard, T. L. (1993). The effects of context on visual representational momentum.Memory & Cognition,21, 103–114.
Hubbard, T. L. (1995). Environmental invariants in the representation of motion: Implied dynamics and representational momentum, gravity, friction, and centripetal force.Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,2, 322–338.
Hubbard, T. L. (1998). Representational momentum and other displacements in memory as evidence for nonconscious knowledge of physical principles. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott (Eds.),Towards a science of consciousness: II. The second Tucson discussions and debates (pp. 505–512). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hubbard, T. L. (1999). How consequences of physical principles influence mental representation: The environmental invariants hypothesis. In P. R. Killeen & W. R. Uttal (Eds.),Fechner Day 99: The End of Twentieth-Century Psychophysics: Proceedings of the 15th annual meeting of the International Society for Psychophysics (pp. 274–279). Tempe, AZ: International Society for Psychophysics.
Hubbard, T. L., &Bharucha J. J. (1988). Judged displacement in apparent vertical and horizontal motion.Perception & Psychophysics,44, 211–221.
Hubbard, T. L., &Ruppel, S. E. (1999). Representational momentum and landmark attraction effects.Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology,27, 294–301.
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory.Journal of Memory & Language,30, 513–541.
Joordens, S., &Merikle, P. M. (1992). False recognition and perception without awareness.Memory & Cognition,20, 151–159.
Joordens, S., van Duijn, M., &Spalek, T. M. (2002). When timing the mind one should also mind the timing: Biases in the measurement of voluntary actions.Consciousness & Cognition,11, 231–240.
Kerzel, D. (2000). Eye movements and visible persistence explain the mislocation of the final position of a moving target.Vision Research,40, 3703–3715.
Kerzel, D., Jordan, J. S., &Müsseler, J. (2001). The role of perceptual anticipation in the mislocation of the final position of a moving target.Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance,27, 829–840.
Kozhevnikov, M., &Hegarty, M. (2001). Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit versus implicit knowledge about motion.Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,8, 439–453.
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Behavioral & Brain Sciences,8, 529–566.
Libet, B., Gleason C. A., Wright, E. W., &Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.Brain,106, 623–642.
Loftus, E. (1974). Reconstructing memory: The incredible eyewitness.Psychology Today,8, 116–119.
Merikle, P. M., &Joordens, S. (1997). Parallels between perception without attention and perception without awareness.Consciousness & Cognition,6, 219–236.
Merikle, P. M., Joordens, S., &Stolz, J. A. (1997). Measuring the relative magnitude of unconscious influences.Consciousness & Cognition,4, 422–439.
Miller, J., &Trevena, J. A. (2002). Cortical movement preparation and conscious decisions: Averaging artifacts and timing biases.Consciousness & Cognition,11, 308–313.
Müsseler, J., Stork, S., &Kerzel, D. (2002). Comparing mislocalizations with moving stimuli: The Fröhlich effect, the flash-lag, and representational momentum.Visual Cognition,9, 120–138.
Nagai, M., Kazai, K., &Yagi, A. (2002). Larger forward displacement in the direction of gravity.Visual Cognition,9, 28–40.
Nagai, M., &Yagi, A. (2001). The pointedness effect on representational momentum.Memory & Cognition,29, 91–99.
Nijhawan, R. (1994). Motion extrapolation in catching.Nature,370, 256–257.
Spalek, T. M., & Hammad, S. (2003).Supporting the attentional momentum view of inhibition of return: Is attention biased to go right? Manuscript submitted for publication.
Thornton, I. M., &Hubbard, T. L. (2002). Representational momentum: New findings, new directions.Visual Cognition,9, 1–7.
Trevena, J. A., &Miller, J. (2002). Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move.Consciousness & Cognition,11, 162–190.
Wegner, D. M. (2002).The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Joordens, S., Spalek, T.M., Razmy, S. et al. A Clockwork Orange: Compensation opposing momentum in memory for location. Memory & Cognition 32, 39–50 (2004). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195819
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195819