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On the reality of the conjunction fallacy

Abstract

Attributing higher “probability” to a sentence of formp-and-q, relative top, is a reasoning fallacy only if (1) the wordprobability carries its modern, technical meaning and (2) the sentencep is interpreted as a conjunct of the conjunctionp-and-q. Legitimate doubts arise about both conditions in classic demonstrations of the conjunction fallacy. We used betting paradigms and unambiguously conjunctive statements to reduce these sources of ambiguity about conjunctive reasoning. Despite the precautions, conjunction fallacies were as frequent under betting instructions as under standard probability instructions.

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Correspondence to Daniel Osherson.

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Sides, A., Osherson, D., Bonini, N. et al. On the reality of the conjunction fallacy. Mem Cogn 30, 191–198 (2002). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195280

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Keywords

  • Noun Phrase
  • Organize Sport
  • Fallacy Rate
  • Word Probability
  • Conjunction Fallacy