Abstract
In three experiments involving over 1,500 university students (n=1,557) and two different probabilistic choice tasks, we found that the utility-maximizing strategy of choosing the most probable alternative was not the majority response. In a story problem version of a probabilistic choice task in which participants chose from among five different strategies, the maximizing response and the probabilitymatching response were each selected by a similar number of students (roughly 35% of the sample selected each). In a more continuous, or trial-by-trial, task, the utility-maximizing response was chosen by only one half as many students as the probability-matching response. More important, in both versions of the task, the participants preferring the utility-maximizing response were significantly higher in cognitive ability than were the participants showing a probability-matching tendency. Critiques of the traditional interpretation of probability matching as nonoptimal may well help explain why some humans are drawn to the nonmaximizing behavior of probability matching, but the traditional heuristics and biases interpretation can most easily accommodate the finding that participants high in computational ability are more likely to carry out the rule-based cognitive procedures that lead to maximizing behavior.
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This article is dedicated to the memory of Kristin Surano, whose enthusiastic assistance with data collection provided invaluable help with this project. This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to K.E.S.
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West, R.F., Stanovich, K.E. Is probability matching smart? Associations between probabilistic choices and cognitive ability. Memory & Cognition 31, 243–251 (2003). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03194383
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03194383