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This research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Grant FOR 375 1-1.
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Geiger, S.M., Oberauer, K. Reasoning with conditionals: Does every counterexample count? It’s frequency that counts. Mem Cogn 35, 2060–2074 (2007). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03192938
- Frequency Information
- Conditional Statement
- Cover Story
- Modus Ponens
- Probability Judgment