Memory & Cognition

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 292–304 | Cite as

Do people keep believing because they want to? Preexisting attitudes and the continued influence of misinformation

  • Ullrich K. H. Ecker
  • Stephan Lewandowsky
  • Olivia Fenton
  • Kelsey Martin
Article

Abstract

Misinformation—defined as information that is initially assumed to be valid but is later corrected or retracted—often has an ongoing effect on people’s memory and reasoning. We tested the hypotheses that (a) reliance on misinformation is affected by people’s preexisting attitudes and (b) attitudes determine the effectiveness of retractions. In two experiments, participants scoring higher and lower on a racial prejudice scale read a news report regarding a robbery. In one scenario, the suspects were initially presented as being Australian Aboriginals, whereas in a second scenario, a hero preventing the robbery was introduced as an Aboriginal person. Later, these critical, race-related pieces of information were or were not retracted. We measured participants’ reliance on misinformation in response to inferential reasoning questions. The results showed that preexisting attitudes influence people’s use of attitude-related information but not the way in which a retraction of that information is processed.

Keywords

Misinformation Continued influence effect Attitudes Beliefs Motivated reasoning 

Supplementary material

13421_2013_358_MOESM1_ESM.docx (19 kb)
ESM 1(DOCX 19 kb)

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Copyright information

© Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ullrich K. H. Ecker
    • 1
  • Stephan Lewandowsky
    • 1
  • Olivia Fenton
    • 1
  • Kelsey Martin
    • 1
  1. 1.School of PsychologyUniversity of Western AustraliaCrawleyAustralia

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