Abstract
In judging posterior probabilities, people often answer with the inverse conditional probability—a tendency named theinverse fallacy. Participants (N=45) were given a series of probability problems that entailed estimating bothp(H\vbD) andp(≈,H\vbD). The findings revealed that deviations of participants’ estimates from Bayesian calculations and from the additivity principle could be predicted by the corresponding deviations of the inverse probabilities from these relevant normative benchmarks. Methodological and theoretical implications of the distinction between inverse fallacy and base-rate neglect and the generalization of the study of additivity to conditional probabilities are discussed.
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The data for this research were collected in 1999 at the Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, United Kingdom while the first author was completing her doctoral thesis. Portions of this research were presented at the Fourth International Thinking Conference, Durham, United Kingdom.
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An erratum to this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03196437.
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Villejoubert, G., Mandel, D.R. The inverse fallacy: An account of deviations from Bayes’s theorem and the additivity principle. Mem Cogn 30, 171–178 (2002). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195278
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03195278