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Memory & Cognition

, Volume 30, Issue 2, pp 171–178 | Cite as

The inverse fallacy: An account of deviations from Bayes’s theorem and the additivity principle

  • Gaëlle Villejoubert
  • David R. Mandel
Article

Abstract

In judging posterior probabilities, people often answer with the inverse conditional probability—a tendency named theinverse fallacy. Participants (N=45) were given a series of probability problems that entailed estimating bothp(H\vbD) andp(≈,H\vbD). The findings revealed that deviations of participants’ estimates from Bayesian calculations and from the additivity principle could be predicted by the corresponding deviations of the inverse probabilities from these relevant normative benchmarks. Methodological and theoretical implications of the distinction between inverse fallacy and base-rate neglect and the generalization of the study of additivity to conditional probabilities are discussed.

Keywords

Sample Space Inverse Probability Bayesian Probability Support Theory Additivity Principle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of VictoriaVictoriaCanada
  2. 2.University Business SchoolUniversity of LeedsLeedsEngland

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