Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

, Volume 14, Issue 6, pp 1147–1152 | Cite as

Intuitivet tests: Lay use of statistical information

  • Natalie A. ObrechtEmail author
  • Gretchen B. Chapman
  • Rochel Gelman
Brief Reports


Normatively, a statistical pairwise comparison is a function of the mean, standard deviation (SD), and sample size of the data. In our experiment, 203 undergraduates compared product pairs and judged their confidence that one product was better than the other. We experimentally manipulated (within subjects) the average product ratings, the number of raters (sample size), and theSD of the ratings. Each factor had two levels selected, so that the same change in statistical power resulted from moving from the low to the high level. We also manipulated (between subjects) whether subjects were given only the product rating data as summarized in a statistical format or the summaries plus the raw ratings. Subjects gave the most weight to mean product ratings, less weight to sample size, and very little weight toSD. Providing subjects with raw data did not increase their use of sample size andSD, as predicted.


Number Line Confidence Rating Conjunction Fallacy Individual Difference Measure Cognitive Reflection 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Natalie A. Obrecht
    • 1
    Email author
  • Gretchen B. Chapman
    • 1
  • Rochel Gelman
    • 1
  1. 1.Psychology DepartmentRutgers UniversityPiscataway

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