Abstract
This work studies voting according to the veto model used by a board of directors to choose between several ways of development of a corporation. Several rules for choosing are considered, including the possibility of a certain player determining the order of the other players’ moves. The specified task is to find the most advantageous preferences of the voters from the viewpoint of the player who makes his choice first. Of special interest is a situation in which one of the players predominates and can determine the order of the other voters’ moves. The problem is solved for three players both in a case of strict preferences and in a case where the voters decide between several equally preferable ways of developing the corporation.
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Original Russian Text © A.I. Mashechkin, 2013, published in Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Vychislitel’naya Matematika i Kibernetika, 2012, No. 4, pp. 29–36.
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Mashechkin, A.I. Estimating the winning chances of a solution suggested by the first player under conditions of voting by veto. MoscowUniv.Comput.Math.Cybern. 37, 28–34 (2013). https://doi.org/10.3103/S027864191204005X
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3103/S027864191204005X