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Formal model of cyber attacks on virtualization tools and a measure of hypervisor vulnerability

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Abstract

A description has been provided for a formal model of cyber attack on virtualization tools that allow one to formulate condition for the security of virtualization tools. The concept of measuring the vulnerability of virtualization tools has been introduced that characterizes the predisposition of a system to vulnerabilities that contribute to the implementation of cyber attacks in the proposed formal model. These characteristics of virtualization tools allow one to compare different hypervisors and estimate the presence of vulnerabilities in them.

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Correspondence to A. V. Nikolskiy.

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Original Russian Text © A.V. Nikolskiy, Yu.S. Vasil’ev, 2015, published in Problemy Informatsionnoi Bezopasnosti. Komp’yuternye Sistemy.

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Nikolskiy, A.V., Vasil’ev, Y.S. Formal model of cyber attacks on virtualization tools and a measure of hypervisor vulnerability. Aut. Control Comp. Sci. 49, 751–757 (2015). https://doi.org/10.3103/S014641161508012X

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.3103/S014641161508012X

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