The Theory of Sovereignty in the Institutional Economics of John R. Commons from the Perspective of Constituent Power

Abstract

We review the discussion of sovereignty in the work of John R. Commons from the perspective of constituent power. His discussion has implications for constituent power as discussed by Negri, Habermas and Arendt. Constituent power is a dynamic wherein forces inside each citizen gather and affect the exercise of power. We illustrate the following two points: First, Commons’s discussion of sovereignty overcomes the limitations discussed. He shows that working rules are constituted by communication in government organisations, namely, the commission. He also shows the possibility of the constitution existing in a sphere of the economy based on concrete procedures. In contrast to Negri and Arendt, he asserts the possibility of the constitution being present in a sphere of the economy through institutionalised procedures, namely, collective bargaining contained in the common-law method. We find this method indicates the constituent system of values and institutions. Second, Commons’s view of the constitution was shaped after his writings of 1889–1890. We learn that he acquired his view of the constitution from his experiences working with the constituent process.