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Bounded Rationality and Institutional Change

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Abstract

The present paper adopts Simons bounded rationality theory in order to explain path dependence of regimes and institutions. Further, we will analyse in a theoretical model the conditions under which path dependence may be broken and new, more efficient institutions that promote growth may emerge. Lastly, we will apply our model to a historical case, the prototype democracy, ancient Athens during the 5th century B.C.

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Correspondence to Nikolas Kyriazis Ph.D.

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Kyriazis, N., Metaxas, T. Bounded Rationality and Institutional Change. Evolut Inst Econ Rev 7, 1–19 (2010). https://doi.org/10.14441/eier.7.1

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