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Can Self-interest Explain Cooperation?

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Abstract

Economists and biologists generally explain cooperation as the result of self-interested action either in repeated interactions or among relatives. We review these models, showing that while repeated interactions in dyads or among relatives do not require other-regarding preferences, cooperation among large numbers of unrelated individuals—a characteristic of human cooperation—cannot be explained in this manner. Other-regarding preferences such as altruism and reciprocity are essential to understanding why humans are, uniquely among animals, a cooperative species.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Santa Fe Institute and University of Siena, UK

    Samuel Bowles

  2. Santa Fe Institute and Central European University, UK

    Herbert Gintis

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  1. Samuel Bowles
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  2. Herbert Gintis
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Correspondence to Samuel Bowles.

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Bowles, S., Gintis, H. Can Self-interest Explain Cooperation?. Evolut Inst Econ Rev 2, 21–41 (2005). https://doi.org/10.14441/eier.2.21

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