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Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream?

  • Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Article

Abstract

Mainstream economics has changed radically since the 1980s, offering greatly enhanced opportunities for intervention by evolutionary and institutional economics. This article surveys the extent of this transformation and the extent that mainstream economics has moved in an evolutionary and institutional direction. There are also signs of a possible gestalt shift in the social sciences, where rules are seen as constitutive of social relations and social reality. This contrasts with the former emphasis in mainstream economics on incremental change and equilibria. On the other hand, mainstream economics has a preoccupation with technique over substance, and the barriers between disciplines impair appropriate conceptual developments.

Keywords

evolutionary economics institutional economics endogenous preferences bounded rationality mainstream economics 

JEL

B0 B52 D0 

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Copyright information

© Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Business SchoolUniversity of Hertfordshire, De Havilland CampusHatfieldUK

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