This section presents the main findings of our analysis in a sequence that chronologically provides evidence to answer the research questions described in the introduction. The results are structured to show how the three contextual factors, competitive, institutional and heritage mechanisms, are linked to and positively or negatively influence HRM and health outcomes in Ethiopian public hospitals.
Competitive mechanisms: competing for resources and not for patients
As defined in Paauwe’s framework, this mechanism entails the product (e.g., service provisioning), market (competitiveness and economic fitness) and technology (innovation) contexts.
None of the respondents mentioned competition for patients. Neither were hospitals perceived to lose patients for reasons of quality or (limitations in) services provided: ‘We don’t lose customers because there is no competition (R8).’ This is likely caused by insufficient capacity to fully meet the demand for care, as can be witnessed in the treatment of admitted patients. For example, ‘Emergency departments have patients on recliners for several days (R11).’ As a result, hospitals appear to compete for scarce resources rather than for customers. Respondents particularly mention the competition for skilled health care professionals. Rural hospitals are most challenged in this competition: ‘Rural hospitals face a critical shortages of nurses, surgeons, radiologists, laboratory technicians, and ENT staff (R17).’ Likewise, public hospitals are perceived to struggle more than private hospitals, which offer better working conditions, such as a higher salary.
Innovation was hardly recognized as a relevant competitive factor. Most respondents reported little to no innovation due to budget shortages, high patient demands and government influence. Among the few exceptions mentioned in health service innovation are the introduction of renal transplantation and the placement of shipping containers to resolve room shortages (R5).
Interestingly, some hospitals have taken innovative approaches to improve their attractiveness as employers, again focusing on the competition for resources. For instance, they offered benefits for their employees, such as free medical services for all staff, a supermarket for personnel, or transportation services. In addition, hospitals tried to enhance their attractiveness as employers through HRM innovations such as increasing autonomy and job security, providing education, and introducing collaborative leadership (R11).
Institutional mechanisms: the dominant role of the government
The institutional mechanisms mentioned in Paauwe’s framework are 1) institutional isomorphisms that influence decision making in organizations, 2) coercive mechanisms that emerge from power sources (e.g., government, employment legislation), and 3) normative mechanisms of adopting standards. They include sociocultural values and norms and the policy, legal and political context impacting strategic HRM practices. The findings for this component relate almost exclusively to the government.
The studied hospitals are subject to coercive pressures that result from government regulations. For instance, respondents frequently mention the influence of stringent regulations. Government regulations are perceived as set in stone and ‘are executed like the Quran and the Bible’ and pervasively impact daily practices in ‘hiring, salary, allowances, promotion, firing, disciplinary measures, as HR managers have no leeway to change them [regulations].’ In exceptional cases, these stringent and pervasive regulations are seen as beneficial and supportive. For instance, regulations to increase maternity leave from 3 to 4 months were perceived as positive, as they improved the quality of life of female workers (R16).
In general, however, respondents considered governmental regulation to be counterproductive. This is especially the case for regulations regarding financial incentives where payment differences that resulted from regulations were perceived as unfair. The respondents considered it to be especially discriminatory if payment differences occurred in cases perceived as comparable:
‘Regulations are not supportive; there is variation in implementing the regulations and law on workforce deployment, salary and allowances even in the same region (R12).’
FG2 members considered that members of the ‘workforce with the same level of occupation, profession and experiences are compensated with different salary levels that violate labour rights, which is discouraging for HR managers and workforce.’
Respondents also explicitly mentioned differences in financial regulation between medical doctors, nurses, and other hospital staff as being unfair, discriminatory, and disproportional. FG3, for example, added: ‘professionals’ work is enabled by the support from a nonclinical cohort of staff as a team, but the regulation violates such teamwork through unfair allowances.’
Some respondents pointed out that ‘ … such differences negatively impact collaboration and team building in hospitals, reduce well-being, and might cause turnover of skilled professionals (R 12).’ ‘Teamwork is coerced rather than built organically via these discriminatory practices (R10).’ FG2 participants shared this view: ‘Although hospital care is teamwork, government regulation violates this culture through discouraging compensation.’
All the studied hospitals reported tension between political versus hospital interests and goals. Politicians are perceived to set up goals for hospitals that mainly refer to productivity in numbers, including numbers of health service professionals and support staff. The activities by which the government subsequently allocates increasing numbers of professionals and staff is sometimes referred to as an HRH flooding strategy. For instance, respondents mentioned the ‘flooding strategy for physicians’ (R3) and the ‘massive production of nurses’ as enforced by politicians ….’ (R10). Respondents perceived that this quantitative focus inhibited attention to the quality of healthcare services for patients and for the well-being of the workforce. Hence, in the eyes of many respondents, politicians prioritized policy interests and political interests, such as party interests, over hospital interests.
‘…. [There is] political imposition to focus on quantity over quality. This has induced gaps in the knowledge and skills of professionals (R19’).
‘Their [politicians’] conflicting interest of fighting for their political issues and maintaining their top position and loyalty to party interest. No attention given for managing hospital and service quality (R3).’
In some cases in which politicians held executive positions in the hospital, political interests were reported to be better aligned with the hospital interests. Compared to their competitors, these hospitals appeared to benefit from political involvement:
‘Our primary hospital is lucky because it has the local-level politicians as board members, and party loyalty made them empowered and confident. They [the politicians] are very supportive with the budget, but at the federal level and in some regions, there is no such political support in budget and HRM issues (R17).’
Normative mechanisms emanating from government regulations affect HRM practices. All the studied hospitals report that government regulation does not accept or allow absenteeism and moonlighting. However, some respondents considered that ‘although moonlighting is an unacceptable norm [to the government), it is practised mostly by skilled professionals because of coercive mechanisms of the government (e.g., not allowing workforce to get equal overtime payment and allowances) (R16).’ ‘This pressures professionals to illegally engage in dual practices or causes high turnover (R1).’ The resultant high turnover might subsequently put the quality of care at risk:
‘Hospitals are a human capital-intensive and risky working environment, but a risk allowance incentive set by policy makers/government for the whole workforce of the hospital was not considered [by management] (FG3).’
‘This is because the regulations failed to address the low salary, which is pushing professionals to leave and negatively impacts service provision and health outcomes (R1).’
Despite the dissatisfaction with the current policy and the felt urgency to change it, some respondents had faith in the improvement attempts. In general, however, respondents stated that the policy reforms aimed at managing budgets and the allocation of the (newly educated) workforce and disregarded the well-being and job satisfaction of the workforce in the public hospitals.
Variation in the implementation of regulations between regions further decreased faith in policy and further increased the dissatisfaction of the workforce:
‘There are variations in implementing health policy, with a lack of health insurance for employees in some regions. It is present in other regions and hospitals, with a clear policy and HR strategy incoherence and inconsistency in the country. This leads to apathy, low satisfaction and performance of the workforce (FG3).’
Heritage mechanisms: A heritage of limited human resource management leeway.
Paauwe’s framework describes heritage mechanisms affecting the human capital context, organizational culture, structure, and systems that ultimately impact HRM. It considers the path dependence of HRM and its fit with other preceding organizational developments.
From the responses, it becomes clear that the aforementioned lack of competition and top-down enforcement of stringent regulations are long standing and have therefore become part of HRM practices. Even on the operational level, the studied hospitals report that staffing issues have been controlled not by hospital management but by ministries and/or regional health bureaus. For example,
‘The role of the HR manager is not recognized because the structure doesn’t empower the HR department, mainly due to failures of health policy reform in addressing HR issues (FG2).’
All hospitals reported a prolonged lack of leeway to develop their own HRM systems and practices. Respondents perceived the regulatory bureaucracy as a complex contextual and organizational structure that hinders the resolution of HRM challenges and promotes political dynamics.
‘The structure of teaching hospitals is very complex and confusing, with accountability to various government bodies and multisector governance from federal ministries (R5).’
‘The governing board is not supportive in addressing hospital demands and HR issues in time; instead, an intersectoral governance approach is missing (FG3).’
Within this difficult and complex environment, leadership was found to be a critical element. However, it was felt that leaders mostly adopted the government logic and were disconnected from HRM and patient care:
‘Our hospital lacks leadership competence, which also contributes to the inability to improve HR issues. This is mainly due to the appointment procedure based on party criteria (FG2).’
Some respondents reported a ‘Lack of a supportive leadership culture in valuing staff as an asset also creating disengagement of workforce (R12).’ ‘Ex-leadership was autocratic, giving more focus to ethnic/tribal and political networks, unable to solve HR problems (R6).’
Positive affirmations of the importance of leadership were also provided: ‘Our hospital has a culture of collaborative leadership in empowering line managers to take HR responsibilities (R11).’ ‘The hospital values the workforce as an asset rather than a cost (R15). ‘There is a culture of collegial relationships that are useful for employee and hospital performance; there is a new culture developed by the CEO of the hospital with a good staff-management relationship (R1).’