The European Physical Journal Special Topics

, Volume 226, Issue 10, pp 2375–2392 | Cite as

Complexity and information flow analysis for multi-threaded programs

Review
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. Aspects of Statistical Mechanics and Dynamical Complexity

Abstract

This paper studies the security of multi-threaded programs. We combine two methods, i.e., qualitative and quantitative security analysis, to check whether a multi-threaded program is secure or not. In this paper, besides reviewing classical analysis models, we present a novel model of quantitative analysis where the attacker is able to select the scheduling policy. This model does not follow the traditional information-theoretic channel setting. Our analysis first studies what extra information an attacker can get if he knows the scheduler’s choices, and then integrates this information into the transition system modeling the program execution. Via a case study, we compare this approach with the traditional information-theoretic models, and show that this approach gives more intuitive-matching results.

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Copyright information

© EDP Sciences and Springer 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Danang, University of Science and TechnologyDanangVietnam
  2. 2.The University of TwenteEnschedeThe Netherlands

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