The effect of the topology on the spatial ultimatum game
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In this work we present an analysis of a spatially non homogeneous ultimatum game. By considering different underlying topologies as substrates on top of which the game takes place we obtain nontrivial behaviors for the evolution of the strategies of the players. We analyze separately the effect of the size of the neighborhood and the spatial structure. Whereas this last effect is the most significant one, we show that even for disordered networks and provided the neighborhood of each site is small, the results can be significantly different from those obtained in the case of fully connected networks.
PACS.89.65.-s Social and economic systems 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management 89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees
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