The relationship between monetary policy and economic development in modern Europe: Problems and possible solutions

Abstract

The author analyzes the risks of dismantling of the European Union posed by the current monetary policy, under which the single currency of the European Union not only retarded economic growth, but also led to economic contraction and high unemployment. Analyzing the widely debated idea of federalization as a way to tackle the challenge of Euroscepticism in major European countries and estimating the net transfers that are necessary for the proper functioning of the recipient country, the author concludes that federalization can only be considered a real action provided the current policy pursued by Germany as the hegemon of the European Union is to change. In the conclusion, the article reviews the problem of monetary independence as a necessary condition for the implementation of a national industrial policy based on the experience of France.

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Correspondence to Jacques Sapir.

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With the publication of a new paper authored by our long-standing collaborator, well-known French scientist Jacques Sapir, we congratulate him on being elected as a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and express our gratitude for his interest in our journal and in Russian economic science. Editorial Board

Original Russian Text © Jacques Sapir, 2017.

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Sapir, J. The relationship between monetary policy and economic development in modern Europe: Problems and possible solutions. Stud. Russ. Econ. Dev. 28, 467–471 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1075700717050161

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