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Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem

  • Systems Analysis and Operations Research
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Abstract

A dynamic game model of bioresource management problem is considered. The center (referee) which shares a reservoir, and the players (countries) which harvest the fish stock on their territory are the participants of this game. In this paper we investigate the new type of equilibrium—cooperative incentive equilibrium. The equilibria are constructed in the case, when the players punish each other for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium, and in the case, when the center punishes them for a deviation. Some results of the numerical modelling are given.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Petrozavodsk, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, Russia

    V. V. Mazalov & A. N. Rettieva

Authors
  1. V. V. Mazalov
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  2. A. N. Rettieva
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Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.V. Mazalov, A.N. Rettieva, 2010, published in Izvestiya Akademii Nauk. Teoriya i Sistemy Upravleniya, 2010, No. 4, pp. 91–99.

The article was translated by the authors.

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Mazalov, V.V., Rettieva, A.N. Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. Int. 49, 598–606 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230710040106

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230710040106

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