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On the solution of hierarchical game under uncertainty with total risk of players

  • Control in Stochastic Systems and Under Uncertainty Conditions
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Abstract

In the paper a static two-level hierarchical game under uncertainty conditions is investigated. The guaranteed Nash equilibrium is constructed between players of levels, which is based on the total risk function. It is shown, that the proposed equilibrium for this game is partially interchangeable with another equilibrium situation and cannot be improved. Properties of the risk function are revealed. The algorithm of solving the game is given and an example is considered.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Borisoglebsk State Pedagogical Institute, Borisoglebsk, Russia

    A. B. Rodyukov & A. F. Tarakanov

Authors
  1. A. B. Rodyukov
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  2. A. F. Tarakanov
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Additional information

Original Russian Text © A.B. Rodyukov, A.F. Tarakanov, 2007, published in Izvestiya Akademii Nauk. Teoriya i Sistemy Upravleniya, 2007, No. 5, pp. 11–17.

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Rodyukov, A.B., Tarakanov, A.F. On the solution of hierarchical game under uncertainty with total risk of players. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. Int. 46, 681–687 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230707050024

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230707050024

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