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Useful New Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Participants

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Abstract

For conflict static and dynamic problems (described by differential equations) considered either on a game set common for all participants or on partly intersecting game sets, we propose new notions of conflict equilibria which are efficient for seeking the solutions of coalition-free and cooperative games and for specifying the hierarchy of all known equilibria. Several examples are used to show that, without the proposed new notions of equilibrium, an actually fair sharing may be impossible in cooperative games.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 119991, Russia

    E. R. Smol’yakov

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  1. E. R. Smol’yakov
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Correspondence to E. R. Smol’yakov.

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Original Russian Text © E.R. Smol’yakov, 2018, published in Differentsial’nye Uravneniya, 2018, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 407–418.

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Smol’yakov, E.R. Useful New Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Participants. Diff Equat 54, 401–412 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266118030114

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266118030114

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