Abstract
For dynamic and static problems with side interests of the participants, new concepts of conflict equilibrium are proposed, which make it possible to find a solution that most satisfies all the participants, especially in those problems in which all known concepts of equilibrium turn out to be ineffective or unsuitable.
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Original Russian Text © E.R. Smol’yakov, 2017, published in Differentsial’nye Uravneniya, 2017, Vol. 53, No. 12, pp. 1703–1714.
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Smol’yakov, E.R. Pareto-Like Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Players. Diff Equat 53, 1654–1666 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266117120126
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266117120126