Abstract
We suggest a new notion of strong conflict equilibrium, which supplements the well-known basic system of conflict equilibria and substantially increases the possibility of finding the unique strongest equilibrium (solution) in any game problem. We demonstrate the efficiency of this equilibrium in examples of static and dynamic game problems.
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Original Russian Text © E.R. Smol’yakov, 2008, published in Differentsial’nye Uravneniya, 2008, Vol. 44, no. 11, pp. 1566–1575.
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Smol’yakov, E.R. Strong equilibrium for conflict problems. Diff Equat 44, 1628–1637 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266108110141
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0012266108110141