Abstract
A new optimality principle is proposed that generalizes the Stackelberg equilibrium principle. Its connection with the classical definition is investigated. The technique of working with the new definition is discussed. As an example, solutions are found in two hierarchical games with feedback.
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Translated by V. Potapchouck
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Gorelov, M.A. Hierarchical Games with Feedback under the Assumption of Benevolence of the Lower-Level Player. Autom Remote Control 83, 437–452 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117922030110
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117922030110