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Evolutionary Methods for Solving Dynamic Resource Allocation Problems

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

This paper proposes a dynamic game-theoretic statement of the resource allocation problem in an organizational system. The application of evolutionary modeling algorithms for solving such problems is considered. Some illustrative examples are given.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, project no. 17-19-01038.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia

    G. I. Beliavsky, N. V. Danilova & G. A. Ougolnitsky

Authors
  1. G. I. Beliavsky
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  2. N. V. Danilova
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  3. G. A. Ougolnitsky
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Correspondence to G. I. Beliavsky, N. V. Danilova or G. A. Ougolnitsky.

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Beliavsky, G.I., Danilova, N.V. & Ougolnitsky, G.A. Evolutionary Methods for Solving Dynamic Resource Allocation Problems. Autom Remote Control 80, 1335–1346 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919070105

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919070105

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