Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 79, Issue 8, pp 1489–1514

# Positional Voting Methods Satisfying the Criteria of Weak Mutual Majority and Condorcet Loser

• A. Yu. Kondratev
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications

## Abstract

This paper considers a voting problem in which the individual preferences of electors are defined by the ranked lists of candidates. For single-winner elections, we apply the criterion of weak positional dominance (WPD, PD), which is closely related to the positional scoring rules. Also we formulate the criterion of weak mutual majority (WMM), which is stronger than the majority criterion but weaker than the criterion of mutual majority (MM). Then we construct two modifications for the median voting rule that satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion. As shown below, WPD and WMM are satisfied for the first modification while PD and MM for the second modification. We prove that there is no rule satisfying WPD and MM simultaneously. Finally, we check a list of 37 criteria for the constructed rules.

## Keywords

positional voting rules weak mutual majority Condorcet loser median voting rule weak positional dominance majoritarian compromise

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## Authors and Affiliations

1. 1.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsSt. PetersburgRussia
2. 2.Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research CenterRussian Academy of SciencesPetrozavodskRussia