Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 180–196 | Cite as

Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions

  • V. A. TopinskiyEmail author
Large Scale Systems Control


This paper analyzes reserve price efficiency in auctions, which is defined as the relative value of the expected revenue increase induced by the optimal reserve price. We give a formal definition of competition (competitive pressure) in auctions and prove that reserve price efficiency is a decreasing function of competition level. And finally, some examples of auction properties affecting monotonically competition level are provided.


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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yandex LLCMoscowRussia
  2. 2.Center for the Study of Diversity and Social Interactions at New Economic SchoolMoscowRussia

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