Abstract
This paper gives an analytical characterization for the strategy-proof sequential allotment mechanisms of a limited resource that are equivalent to the straight and reverse priority mechanisms. The previously known equivalence of the anonymous priority mechanisms is extended to the non-anonymous case by establishing the following fact: for an arbitrary straight priority mechanism, there exists an equivalent reverse priority mechanism, but the converse fails. And finally, we provide a characterization for the class of reverse priority mechanisms having an equivalent straight priority mechanism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Burkov, V.N., Gorgidze, I.I., Novikov, D.A., and Yusupov, B.S., Modeli i mekhanizmy raspredeleniya zatrat i dokhodov v rynochnoi ekonomike (Models and Mechanisms of Distribution of Costs and Income in a Market Economy), Moscow: Inst. Probl. Upravlen., 1997.
Burkov, V.N., Danev, B., Enaleev, A.K., et al., Bol’shie sistemy: modelirovanie organizatsionnykh mekhanizmov (Large-scale Systems: Modeling of Organizational Mechanisms), Moscow: Nauka, 1989.
Burkov, V.N., Korgin, N.A., and Novikov, D.A., Vvedenie v teoriyu upravleniya organizatsionnymi sistemami (Introduction to Theory of Organizational Systems Control), Novikov, D.A., Ed., Moscow: Librokom, 2009. Translated under the title Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations, New York: CRC Press, 2015.
Intrilligator, M., Matematicheskie metody optimizatsii i ekonomicheskaya teoriya (Mathematical Optimization Methods and Economics), Moscow: Progress, 1975.
Moulin, H., Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988. Translated under the title Kooperativnoe prinyatie reshenii: aksiomy i modeli, Moscow: Mir, 1991.
Novikov, D.A., Teoriya upravleniya organizatsionnymi sistemami (Theory of Organizational Systems Control), Moscow: Fizmatlit, 2007, 2nd ed. Translated under the title Theory of Control in Organizations (Management Science-Theory and Applications), Hauppauge: Nova Science, 2013.
Barberá, S., Jackson, M., and Neme, A., Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules, Games Econom. Behav., 1997, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1–21.
Bossert, W. and Weymark, J.A., Social Choice (New Developments), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Durlauf, S.N. and Blume, L.E., Eds., Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008, 2nd ed.
Mas-Collel, A., Whinston, M.D., and Green, J.R., Microeconomic Theory, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
Sprumont, Y., The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Rule, Econometrica, 1991, vol. 59, pp. 509–519.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Original Russian Text © N.A. Korgin, 2009, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2009, No. 3, pp. 46–70.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Korgin, N.A. Equivalence and strategy-proofness of non-anonymous priority allotment mechanisms. Autom Remote Control 77, 2065–2079 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511791611014X
Received:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511791611014X