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Competitive routing of traffic flows by navigation providers

Automation and Remote Control volume 77, pages 179–189 (2016)Cite this article

Abstract

This paper studies a game-theoretic model of traffic flow assignment with multiple customer groups and the BPR delay function on a parallel channel network. We prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in the game of m ≥ 2 traffic navigation providers and derive explicit expressions for equilibrium strategies. And finally, we show that the competition of navigation providers on the network increases the average travel time between origin and destination areas.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Saint Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    V. V. Zakharov & A. Yu. Krylatov

  2. Solomenko Institute of Transport Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg, Russia

    A. Yu. Krylatov

Authors
  1. V. V. Zakharov
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  2. A. Yu. Krylatov
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to V. V. Zakharov.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.V. Zakharov, A.Yu. Krylatov, 2014, published in Upravlenie Bol’shimi Sistemami, 2014, No. 49, pp. 129–147.

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Zakharov, V.V., Krylatov, A.Y. Competitive routing of traffic flows by navigation providers. Autom Remote Control 77, 179–189 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117916010112

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117916010112

Keywords

  • Travel Time
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Remote Control
  • NASH
  • Transportation Network