Abstract
This paper is dedicated to analysis and solution of an extended voting game. According to the extension, a new player enters the voting game, seeking to maximize a power index (i.e., its component of the Shapley–Shubik value) under a given capital. By assumption, other players sell their stocks (in full or in part) to the new player without hindrance and any benefits gained.
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Petrosian, L.A., Zenkevich, N.A., and Shevkoplyas, E.V., Teoriya igr (Game Theory), St. Petersburg: BKhV-Peterburg, 2012.
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Original Russian Text © O.L. Petrosian, 2013, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2013, No. 1, pp. 61–73.
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Petrosian, O.L. Formation of new coalitional structures in voting games. Autom Remote Control 76, 2070–2077 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915110156
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915110156