Abstract
We demonstrate that any sequential allotment rule enjoying strategy-proofness on the domain of single-peaked preference functions can be represented in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of active expertise on the domain of multidimensional single-plateaued preference functions, i.e., a generalized median voter scheme with a tie-breaking rule.
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Original Russian Text © N.A. Korgin, 2012, published in Upravlenie Bol’shimi Sistemami, 2012, No. 36, pp. 186–208.
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Korgin, N.A. Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise. Autom Remote Control 75, 983–995 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117914050178
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117914050178