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Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

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Abstract

This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agents’ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation procedures; they can be applied for solving the posed problem.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University), Dolgoprudny, Russia

    V. N. Bondarik

  2. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    N. A. Korgin

Authors
  1. V. N. Bondarik
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  2. N. A. Korgin
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Original Russian Text © V.N. Bondarik, N.A. Korgin, 2012, published in Problemy Upravleniya, 2012, No. 5, pp. 26–32.

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Bondarik, V.N., Korgin, N.A. Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation. Autom Remote Control 74, 1557–1566 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117913090117

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117913090117

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